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On September 30, 1956, Zohra Drif, Djamila Bouhired, and Samia Lakhdari—women in 
their early twenties and members of  the Algerian Front de Libération Nationale (FLN)—
crossed the checkpoint between the Arab quarter and the European quarter of  Algiers, 
dressed in European styles for a day at the beach and carrying bombs to be planted in 
cafés and bars popular with French colonial settlers in Algeria, or pieds-noirs.1 This militant 
action was carried out in response to an attack by right-wing French ultras—with police 
complicity—on the Rue de Thèbes some months previous, attacks that had killed 70 Muslim 
Algerians, including children. Two out of  three of  the revolutionary women’s bombs 
exploded, killing 12 and injuring 50 pieds-noirs, including children. The coordinated attacks 
were instrumental in bringing international attention to the Algerian situation and to the 
eventual victory of  the FLN against French colonial rule in 1962 (Horne 1989, 184-86; 
Vince 2010). Importantly, Drif, Bouhired, and Lakhdari’s clothing played a pivotal role in 
their success. In the decades leading up to the Algerian Revolution, French colonialists saw 
native Algerian society as “backwards,” a “backwardness” exemplified in the widespread 
oppression of  women and metonymically expressed in the Muslim practices of  veiling 
women. The French campaigned for Algerian “natives” to abandon religious practices 
in order to embrace more modern French customs of  dress and behavior (Al-Saji 2010, 
876). Educated women who already at times dressed in European fashions, Drif, Bouhired, 
and Lakhdari defied the exotified stereotype of  the “native” Algerian woman. Exploiting 
the colonial assumption that Algerian women dressed in European clothes and engaging 
in flirtatious banter with the French guards were opting to leave behind their oppressive, 
traditional culture and assimilating to “emancipated” modern French values, they were able 
to pass the checkpoint without suspicion (Drif  2017, 115; Vince 2010, 451, 454). When it 
suited them on other occasions, these same women again deployed clothing in order to 
play upon the French stereotype of  the ignorant and submissive Algerian woman, donning 
1 This scene is famously dramatized in Pontecorvo (1966).
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traditional veils (which in different circumstances also worked well to disguise one’s face and 
to smuggle bombs and other supplies) and keeping their eyes downcast (Vince 2010, 451, 
454). Ironically, throughout the years of  the Algerian War of  Independence gender relations 
did transform, with woman fighting alongside men and taking on substantial leadership 
and decision-making roles in the revolutionary efforts. However, this transformation was 
not thanks to the assimilation of  French cultural values and practices on the part of  the 
“native” Algerian subjects, but thanks to the experiences of  Algerian women and men 
fighting alongside one another against French colonial rule (Russon 2017, 116-17). 
This bloody historical episode is a rich one for helping us to understand the nature of  
human agency, freedom, and transformation, particularly in contexts of  political oppression 
and multiculturalism. As Frantz Fanon (1965) explores in his essay “Algeria Unveiled,” 
what we witness in the Algerians’ evolving relationship to women’s “traditional” dress is 
both the violent rejection of  the domineering economic, political, and cultural incursion 
of  the colonizer, and the creative (re)birth of  the Algerians as a nation. However, familiar 
liberal conceptions of  human agency can obscure the lessons that the Algerian War of  
Independence has to offer concerning the nature of  agency and authentic transformation 
in unchosen, and often oppressive, multicultural contexts. Emerging predominantly—but 
not exclusively—from the lineage of  early Christianity and the modern European culture 
birthed by the Scientific Revolution and the Enlightenment, the now familiar liberal 
conception of  agency emphasizes the sacredness of  the human individual as the subject 
of  freedom and the locus of  value. This Enlightenment emphasis on individualism has 
historically gone hand-in-hand with the increasing secularization of  European culture, 
which asserts a strict distinction between the secular public sphere and the private domain 
of  religious commitment, and which thus treats religion as a separate, optional domain of  
human existence rather than as integral to it. These two premises of  the post-Enlightenment 
worldview—the premise of  individualism and premise of  secularism—tend to lose sight 
of  themselves as historically-developed, contingent premises, assuming a kind of  modern 
objectivity of  vision that contrasts with that of  more collectivized and religious—read, 
more “traditional” and “backwards”—ways of  thinking and living.
Phenomenology as a philosophical method helps us to identify cultural and historical 
prejudices that inform our perception of  ourselves and the world, enabling us to bracket 
these prejudices so as to allow the world of  experience to show itself  in new and richer ways. 
In this paper, I draw on diverse phenomenological resources in order to “denaturalize” 
some of  the individualistic and secularist prejudices that structure many of  our perspectives 
on our own and others’ experiences as cultural beings—prejudices that, I argue, have 
deleterious political consequences—so as to better draw out some of  the principal lessons 
about cultural belonging and dynamic cultural transformation offered by events such as the 
Algerian War of  Independence. 
In Part I, I draw on phenomenologists Martin Heidegger and Maurice Merleau-Ponty 
alongside the memoirs of  Zohra Drif  (one of  the revolutionaries responsible for the 1956 
attacks against the pieds-noirs in Algiers) in order to argue that rather than agency being 
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a matter of  an individual’s self-conscious rationality, agency is always formed in worldly, 
habitual, and intersubjective contexts. In Part II, I challenge some of  the prejudices of  
modern secularism, drawing on phenomenologist John Russon’s interpretation of  religion 
in order to argue that rather than being a foregrounded matter of  private, individual 
choice, religion is more basically a “background” structure of  cultural worlds themselves, 
and thus inherent to the fabric of  historical human agency. Our ways of  understanding and 
capacities for acting as individuals are deeply cultural; crucially, however, cultures are not 
monoliths but rather, in Russon’s words, “always palimpsests, always texts written on top of  
earlier writing” (2017, 73). What we call “Algeria” and what we call “France” are not static 
essences but multicultural palimpsests of  Berber, Arab, Turkish, Jewish, Muslim and, since 
1830, modern European sources by way of  French colonization, in the case of  Algeria, 
and Greco-Roman, Medieval Christian, their regional European neighbors (themselves 
complex palimpsests), and the fruits of  their colonial adventures in North America, the 
Caribbean, India, Africa, and Indochina, in the case of  France. I conclude, in Part III, by 
arguing that phenomenology can help us to bracket common prejudices regarding both the 
neutrality of  our own cultures and the monolithic simplicity of  other cultures, allowing us 
to see the manners in which our cultural horizons offer us diverse resources upon which to 
draw in our self-understandings in the present, and enabling more honest and just visions 
of  multicultural human existence and political transformation to come to the fore.
 
I. THE WORLDED, HABITUAL, AND INTERSUBJECTIVE NATURE OF AGENCY
Enlightenment conceptions of  freedom that inform much of  contemporary liberal 
thought—what we might call the “natural attitude” of  liberalism—typically hold 
individualistic and rationalistic conceptions of  agency.2 It is common to think of  agency 
both in terms of  a freedom from external constraint or interference, and in terms of  a 
capacity for rational self-government in one’s own behaviors and choices (see, for example, 
Berlin 2002 and Christman 1991). From this perspective, it is easy to see individual agency 
and participation in “traditional” cultural practices—particularly practices perceived 
from the outside as “oppressive”—as in opposition to or tension with one another. This is 
certainly a tendency in the discourse of  liberal feminism, as Uma Narayan (2002) points 
out. Narayan identifies two widespread constructs in popular discourse in the “West” 
concerning the situations of  “non-Western” women, both of  which put into binary 
opposition individual agency and cultural oppression. The first construct Narayan calls 
“the prisoner of  patriarchy”: women are seen as the unwilling victims of  such practices as 
veiling, purdah (seclusion), and arranged marriages (418). The second construct Narayan 
calls “the dupe of  patriarchy”: women are seen as uncritically “buying into” the patriarchal 
norms and practices of  their cultures, such that what appear to be their “own” choices 
really are not (418-19). We can see both of  these constructs at play, for example, in Susan 
2 On the natural attitude, see Husserl (1999, 33-37); see also Gadamer (1989, 300) on the seemingly “self-
evident” results of  understanding.
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Moller Okin’s (1999) “Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women?,” in which patriarchal practices 
in “fundamentalist” countries and immigrant communities in the West, such as polygamy, 
are understood as unmitigated violations of  women’s individual rights, and women are 
presented either as vocally unwilling prisoners of  these cultures (see, for example, Okin 
1999, 10), or as willing participants whose willingness can only be accounted for thanks to 
having “imbibe[d] their sense of  inferiority virtually from birth” (Okin 1998, 675). 
Even when authors in the liberal tradition resist the constructs of  “the prisoner of  
patriarchy” and the “dupe of  patriarchy” and attempt to take “non-Western” women 
seriously as agents, a binary opposition between (individual) agency and (cultural) oppression 
is often still apparent. Consider the following hypothetical case from Marina Oshana of  a 
woman who voluntarily chooses to live under Taliban law in pre-2001 Afghanistan:
Having previously enjoyed a successful career as a physician, this 
woman has since chosen, under conditions free of  whatever factors 
might disable self-awareness, and with a considered appreciation of  
the implications of  her decision, a life of  utter dependence. She can 
no longer practice medicine . . . She is not permitted to support 
herself  financially. She has no voice in the manner and duration 
of  any schooling that her children, particularly her daughters, 
might receive. She must remain costumed in cumbersome garb—a 
burqa—when in public…But a life of  subservience is consistent with 
the Taliban woman’s spiritual and social values, provides her with a 
sense of  worth, and satisfies her notion of  well-being. . . . I think it 
is evident that the Taliban woman is not autonomous . . . Although 
the Taliban woman is “master of  her will”—her original decision 
was made autonomously, she willingly renounces her rights, and she 
continues to express satisfaction with the life that she has selected 
for herself—she now has no practical authority over her situation…
Although the Taliban does what she wants, what she wants frustrates 
the exercise of  autonomy. (2003, 104-05)
Though this woman counts as an agent in the broad liberal sense—she is free from overt 
external constraint and she makes choices as “master” of  her own will—Oshana argues 
that she nevertheless gives up her autonomous agency in the meaningful sense of  that term: 
she gives up her own “practical authority over her situation,” and can thus be said to be 
genuinely oppressed as an agent by her religious culture.
Phenomenologically, the lived experience of  agency does not admit to the binary 
conceptions of  (individual) freedom and (cultural) oppression at play in both Okin and 
Oshana’s arguments. Rather, phenomenological description that attends to the lived 
experience of  some of  the women in question themselves reveals that before agency is a 
matter of  individual choice within a given situation, agency is born of  meaningful situations 
themselves: agency is a matter of  world. The “world” is the meaningful context in which 
lived experience unfolds: it is the horizon in which we are at home, in which things matter 
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to us, and in terms of  which we can meaningfully effect our agency as individuals.3 Rather 
than a collection of  objects, the world is the “clearing” [Lichtung], as Heidegger says, in 
which self, things, and others assume their meaningful identities and capacities in mutual 
relation (1962, 171). In Inside the Battle of  Algiers: Memoir of  a Woman Freedom Fighter, Zohra 
Drif  describes the world of  her childhood, a world that was lived as inseparable from her 
own sense of  self: 
I knew from a young age who and where I was: an Algerian in her 
own country. I also knew early on that my land was occupied, seized 
for no purpose other than rape and theft, and that the roumi—the 
Roman, the foreigner from the north—was both the rapist and 
the thief. I lived every moment with such an acute awareness of  
this fact that it became like my skin, my blood, or the beating of  
my heart, and was frequently revived by the events around me. As 
a child, when I accompanied my mother and my aunts, traipsing 
together across vast fields to visit the tomb of  wali salah—a local 
patron saint—the women explained to me that in truth these lands 
belonged to such-and-such tribe, which had been dispossessed in 
favor of  such-and-such colonist. In doing so, they transmitted to us 
the history, sociology, and true map of  our country. (2017, 4)
In the world of  the young Drif, the fields are given not as “mere things,” as Heidegger says, 
but as “belonging to such-and-such a person” (1962, 97, 153). In other words, things are 
always already charged with shared meanings—and embody a shared history—within the 
larger context of  a world, and one’s own identity is inseparable from this larger context, 
which is felt, in Drif ’s words, in one’s skin, blood, and the beating of  one’s heart. As 
Heidegger writes, “a bare subject without a world” is never given (152). We are never 
individual, worldless subjects in a position to make an “original decision” (in Oshana’s 
words) about the world in which we would like to belong; rather we always already find 
ourselves, in Judith Butler’s words, within “a realm of  social norms that we do not fully 
choose, but that provides the horizon and the resource for any sense of  choice that we have” 
(2004, 33).4
Another premise tacitly presumed in the kind of  liberal thinking identified above is 
that individual agency is largely a matter of  self-conscious rationality. A phenomenological 
account of  agency, by contrast, reveals that our capacities as agents are more basically 
pre-reflective and habitual than self-conscious and rational. One’s habitual skills open up 
the world in specific ways: it is because one can walk that the fields between home and the 
3 On the existential experience of  being at home in the world, see Jacobson (2009, 2010) and Russon 
(2017, 35-60). On the way in which our developed identities are reflected back to us in the things with 
which we are educated to skillfully engage, see John Dewey’s discussion of  the human environment as 
“the things with which a man varies” (2008, 15). 
4 See also Heidegger’s discussion of  “thrownness” (1962, 219-24), and Young’s discussion of  this 
concept in the context of  inherited group identities (1990, 46-47).
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tomb of  wali salah are given as traversable, because one can speak Arabic that the stories 
of  one’s mother and aunts can be incorporated into the map of  one’s country. This is what 
Merleau-Ponty means when he argues that “[c]onsciousness is originarily not an ‘I think 
that,’ but rather an ‘I can’” (2012, 139). These embodied powers for action are for the most 
part not foregrounded in self-conscious or rational experience, but rather persist in the 
background of  our experience as “the darkness of  the theater required for the clarity of  the 
performance” (103).
When certain aspects of  the world are illuminated through habit, however, other aspects 
are obscured; as Iris Marion Young argues, “[f]or any bodily existence…an ‘I cannot’ may 
appear to set limits to the ‘I can’” (1980, 147). We can see the dynamic of  capacity and 
incapacity at the heart of  all embodied, determinate agency in Drif ’s description of  her 
experience living on her own for the first time as a student at the University of  Algiers, a 
French colonial institution at which Drif  was one of  a small minority of  Muslim students, 
and one of  an even smaller minority of  Muslim women students. Drif  reports that her 
mother, who passionately supported the education of  Muslim girls and women, sent her off 
to university with the admonition to make her people proud, which meant both excelling 
academically and upholding the Muslim Algerian code of  behavior for young women, 
specifically when it came to the strict separation of  the sexes outside of  immediate family 
members. Drif ’s mother said to her: “‘[Y]ou must never forget that we are not French: they 
have their culture and traditions, and we have ours. Keep in mind that you are responsible 
for your honor and all your people’s, and that by your conduct, you will either be the key 
that will open the door of  all possibilities to our other girls, or you will close it forever” 
(2017, 35). Drif  writes that she and her close friend and classmate Samia Lakhdari (one of  
the other women bombers) 
threw ourselves into this challenge as one would into a new religion 
. . . Looking back, I can now see that we were very unpleasant—
even unbearable. So much so that one day in the study hall, when a 
fellow “native” student approached me to ask for some information 
about one of  our classes, my instinctive reaction to reject him was 
so brutal that the poor boy took to his heels without even asking for 
explanation. (37)
Drif ’s mother’s injunction, which simultaneously gave her a specific route into being a 
passionate and able young scholar and forbade certain kinds of  interaction, became imbued 
in her habitual ways of  perceiving and responding to the world, making certain things 
appear as possible and others as impossible at the level not of  self-conscious understanding 
but of  “instinct,” or second nature.
These considerations point to the limitations of  individualistic and rationalistic 
conceptions of  “choice.” They indicate that when we want to change things in our lives, 
effective agency requires not the escape from habit into thinking—and not the triumph of  
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reason over passion—but rather the formation of  new and different habits.5 Paradoxically, 
it is by submitting ourselves to new disciplines and practices that we develop new capacities 
as agents. Saba Mahmood writes: 
To clarify this paradox, we might consider the example of  the virtuoso 
pianist who submits herself  to the often painful regime of  disciplinary 
practice, as well as to the hierarchical structures of  apprenticeship, 
in order to acquire the ability—the requisite agency—to play the 
instrument with mastery. Importantly, her agency is predicated 
upon her ability to be taught, a condition classically referred to as 
“docility.” (2005, 29)
As an example of  such agency through submission, Mahmood describes the content of  
a conversation between two women participating in an after-work women’s group at a 
mosque in downtown Cairo in the mid-1990s, in the context of  the Egyptian women’s 
piety movement. One woman describes difficulty waking up at dawn for the first of  the five 
daily prayers [salawāt] required of  Muslims, and the other offers her the following advice: 
treat the dawn prayer [salāt] as something that one must do—as important as eating—and 
one will find that, with Allah closer to one’s mind as a result, the difficulties of  mundane life 
become easier. Over time, one will want to wake up for the morning prayer: it is not desire 
that leads to action, but disciplined action that is productive of  desire; not good character 
that leads to good malaka (habit), but the disciplined practice of  good malaka that give rise 
to good character (2005, 125-26, 134-39). Changes in one area of  life will reverberate 
throughout one’s existence. We can see the truth of  these points about habituation in Drif ’s 
personal transformation while at the University of  Algiers, during which time she and 
Lakhdari sought out and joined the armed wing of  the FLN. “Habit expresses the power 
we have of  dilating our being in the world,” Merleau-Ponty writes (2012, 145). Militant 
discipline to the cause of  an independent Algeria distinctly broadened Drif ’s horizons and 
radically changed her everyday life. For example, in her desire to make contact with the 
FLN, Drif  could be seen walking and talking passionately about her aspirations to change 
the Algerian situation with young Muslim men to whom she was not related, hoping to find 
a route into the necessarily highly-secretive organization. The perceived possibilities and 
impossibilities of  Drif ’s habitual world underwent a dramatic change.
Implicit in these phenomenological discussions of  the “worlded” and habitual nature 
of  agency is the manner in which individual agency is deeply bound up with other people. 
The narrative arc of  Drif ’s life from childhood through to her militant involvement in 
the Algerian War of  Independence as a young woman is certainly one of  increasing 
individuality and independence—Drif  displays a striking mind of  her own—as she moves 
from the family home into the wider world of  Algeria, but it is at the same time one of  
developing, changing, and inaugurating relationships with other people, from the stories 
5 For an excellent discussion of  this point, see Russon (2003, 75-121, esp. 86-87). 
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of  her older women relatives that mapped her landscape, to her mother’s injunction at the 
heart of  her habits at the start of  her university studies, to a deep and abiding friendship 
with her “sister” and comrade in arms Lakhdari, to the “brotherly” relationships Drif  
came to form with Ali Ammar (Ali La Pointe) and Saâdi Yacef  (El Kho), key male leaders 
in the FLN. Throughout her burgeoning as a revolutionary, Drif  was also nourished by the 
example of  figures from the history of  Algeria and of  the Islamic community [ummah] more 
broadly, as well as from ideas and events from the French tradition studied at the lycée and 
at university. Who we are and what we can do as individuals is inherently intersubjective, 
and the determinate ways in which we realize our agency always requires, in Simone de 
Beauvoir’s words, an “apprenticeship of  freedom” (2015, 37).
If  our choices always take place within the unchosen context of  a meaningful world 
and through our pre-reflective reliance on our habitual powers, then we are never simply 
“‘masters of  our will,’” as Oshana says (2003, 104). And if  our identities are always already 
intersubjectively bound up with the identities of  others—interpersonally, culturally, and 
cross-culturally—then we are never in a position to make a self-conscious, “original choice” 
concerning our group belonging—concerning the intersubjective context that gave birth to 
choices as meaningful, and to our identities as choosers, to begin with. As Russon argues: 
[B]ecoming a member of  society—becoming self-conscious—really 
requires not knowing who one is, not knowing what it means to be 
a member of  society, not being explicitly self-conscious in one’s 
social identity. One becomes a reflective self  precisely through not 
being reflectively self-conscious of  this process of  becoming such.  
(1995, 516)
Understanding free agency in terms of  an extra-worldly self  in a position to make “original 
choices” with regard to her agency as an individual or with regard to her cultural belonging 
misses the mark; worse, such impoverished understanding can have deleterious political 
consequences. Before making this case in Part III, however, let us turn to a phenomenological 
account of  religious life, and of  how we become self-conscious individuals only within the 
meaningful parameters of  what is “religiously” given as obvious and of  value.
 
 
II. RELIGIOUS GESTURES AND CULTURAL HORIZONS
The unduly individualistic and rationalistic vision of  agency also extends to our 
understanding of  religion. Two of  the principal marks of  secularization in post-
Enlightenment European modernity are, first, the separation of  religion and state and, 
second, the increased differentiation of  society into discrete religious, economic, political, 
scientific, aesthetic, educational, and familial spheres (Mahmood 2005, 47). From a secular 
perspective, religion is viewed as an optional matter of  private conscience rather than as 
pervasive in human existence. We see such a perspective tacitly at play in Oshana’s argument 
about the Taliban woman quoted above: this hypothetical woman’s participation in a 
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conservative religious culture is conceived in terms of  this woman’s private reason and will 
as an individual agent, and in terms of  her personal preference satisfaction. Furthermore, 
religion is not uncommonly seen as recalcitrant to Enlightenment reason and as responsible 
for much of  the violence, oppression, and war in the contemporary world (see, for example, 
Dawkins 1977 and Russell 1957, 22). We find a feminist version of  this attitude with both 
Okin and Oshana: individual women are understood as needing to have their individual 
rights protected against the religions that oppress them.6
In Sites of  Exposure: Art, Politics, and the Nature of  Experience, Russon argues that before 
religion is a matter of  individual belief  it is a fundamentally cultural matter (2017, 81). 
First and foremost, religion is the way in which a culture collectively affirms its sense of  
what is of  ultimate value, and correspondingly defines itself  in relation to that “absolute” 
(2015, 45-46). Indeed, in an earlier essay, Russon argues that the phenomenon of  “world” 
described by Heidegger is already inherently religious. He explains:
It is in the ritual laying out of  how to behave—which means how 
I should act, and how things should be acted upon—that what 
will count as the obvious and immediate significance of  things is 
established. It is the world made significant through ritual which 
allows the members of  a society . . . to find themselves reflected and 
confirmed in the stuff of  their environment. . . .  Thus, far from being 
the experience of  mysterium tremendum et fascinans, the core of  religion is 
precisely the experience of  things as familiar. (1995, 517-18)
Understood thusly, religion is most basically not a powerful, foregrounded personal 
experience, but a shared, background condition of  experience. The things and structures 
of  our built world and the multitude of  our embodied practices work together to give voice 
to our collective, pre-reflective understanding of  what is of  ultimate value—that is, to our 
collective, pre-reflective understanding of  the “divine”—as historical communities.
Contra the understanding of  religion as a discrete domain of  human existence, religion 
can phenomenologically be understood to pervade all aspects of  cultural existence. 
Architecture is a prime example of  how a people’s sense of  who they are is “reflected and 
confirmed in the stuff of  their environment.” As G.W. F. Hegel describes in his Aesthetics: 
Lectures on Fine Art and as Heidegger makes vivid in his essay, “The Origin of  the Work 
of  Art,” a structure such as a Greek temple is expressive of  a people’s tacit religious 
commitments concerning the relationship between nature, the gods, and the human 
community. Hegel identifies a number of  key features of  the Greek temple: it is built with 
an eye to the natural environment that surrounds it, into which it fits seamlessly; it is at 
the same time built according to the mathematical laws of  harmony and regularity; it is a 
6 For a helpful criticism of  Okin’s impoverished view of  religion, particularly in the context of  Islam, 
see Al-Hibri (1999).
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public, open enclosure that is built on a human scale, emphasizing breadth over height, and 
that does not clearly demarcate between inside and outside; and it provides a house for the 
god it is built to honor that is incorporated into, rather than made remote from, the human 
world (1975b, 660-83). Compare the collective self-understanding that both contributed to 
and was reinforced by the existence of  the Greek temple to the kind of  dwelling opened up 
by the Sultan Ahmet Mosque in Istanbul, as described by Russon:
Seen from a distance, the gentle, billowing curves of  the massive 
domes suggest an attitude of  spiritual serenity, especially when 
complemented by the ethereal call to prayer that emanates from 
the muezzin singing high in the minaret and that pervades from 
above the whole city environment. The huge, unarticulated interior 
space similarly communicates a calm vastness that embraces and 
exceeds the community of  worshipers. Rather than being a building 
on a human scale that communicates unity with the natural world, 
the mosque seems to point to our need to submit ourselves to an 
infinite beyond—a beautiful, beckoning reality that offers itself  
precisely when we withdraw from the everyday terms of  natural life.  
(Russon 2017, 70)7
Very different visions of  nature, of  the human community, and of  ultimate value are built 
into the cultural landscape itself, shaping what is “obvious” and generally unquestioned for 
the individuals who dwell within its familiar horizons. Works such as the Greek temple and 
the Islamic mosque, as Heidegger writes, articulate “what is holy and what unholy, what 
great and what small, what brave and what cowardly, what lofty and what flighty, what 
master and what slave” (1993, 169). Religion does not take place “in” the minds of  the 
devoted; rather, the beliefs and practices of  the devoted emerge and take place against the 
meaningful background of  the religious. 
Clothing, like architecture, does not merely fulfill a utilitarian purpose; it can be a 
religious gesture. This is certainly true of  Islamic practices of  veiling, practices that have 
some basis in the Qur’an but that probably did not become widespread until three or 
four generations after the Prophet Mohammed’s death, largely influenced—cultures being 
palimpsests—by the Byzantine Christians’ practices of  segregating and veiling women 
(Armstrong 2002, 16). Islamic veiling traditions have been highly diverse historically and 
regionally, and, in the colonial and postcolonial contexts, have been a potent symbol of  
7 Compare Russon’s discussion of  the Mosque to Hegel’s discussion of  romantic architecture, with 
its focus on European cathedrals (1975b, 684-700 and 1975a, 517-612). It is important to note that 
European cathedrals were heavily influenced by Islamic architecture, with Crusaders bringing many of  
the latter’s concepts back to Europe in the twelfth century (Wainwright 2020).
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both religious piety and cultural preservation for many Muslim women.8 Learning to 
wear a veil is not a simple matter: it is a matter of  learning and discipline. Marnia Lazreg 
describes the violence of  having to forego the carefree relationship to one’s own body and 
the outdoor environment enjoyed in girlhood in order to learn to wear veils of  varying 
levels of  restrictiveness in adolescence, and Drif  describes the prohibitive awkwardness of  
attempting to wear the traditional haïk of  the Casbah neighborhood in Algiers for the first 
time, as a revolutionary disguise (Lazreg 2009, 29-31; Drif  2017, 65, 150). But when girls 
and women do become habituated to the traditional veils of  their regions or neighborhoods, 
these religious garments can become incorporated into what Merleau-Ponty calls the “body 
schema”: they become like extensions of  the bodily “I can” itself, and thus can become a 
part of, rather than an obstacle to, the girl or the woman’s agency, in the background of  her 
experience rather than the foreground (2012, 100-05).9 This is a complicated matter, since 
identity, and hence agency, is dynamic and can habitually realize itself  in different manners 
in different circumstances. For example, Drif  describes her lived compulsion to re-don the 
veil that she had been wearing since the age of  twelve when she went home to her family 
for holidays, even though she had ceased wearing it at the university in Algiers (2017, 20). 
Removing one’s habitual, religious clothing is, therefore, no small thing. Drawing on his 
work as a psychiatrist in Algeria during the early years of  the Revolution, Fanon reports 
that newly unveiled women dreamt of  their bodies “being cut up into bits, put adrift; the 
limbs seem[ing] to lengthen indefinitely . . . The unveiled body seems to escape, to dissolve. 
She has an impression of  being improperly dressed, even of  being naked” (1965, 59). It is 
in light of  the veil becoming an extension of  the lived body that we should understand the 
particular violence of  the French pressuring Algerian women to remove the veil: Fanon 
argues that masquerading as the secular desire to modernize or civilize a “backwards” and 
oppressive traditional culture, it in fact betrays a desire to undress the Algerian woman 
akin to voyeurism and rape (42).10 Rather than being an optional garment that she can 
don or discard at will and without consequence, Fanon sees the veil is intimately related to 
the individual’s sense of  identity and belonging in relationship to the practices and values 
of  her world, and the French’s desire to “unveil” the Algerian women is at once a bodily 
violation of  individuals and the domination of  a world.
 
8 On the regional variation of  the veil in Algeria, see Fanon (1965, 36n1, 36n2, 36n3, and 36n4) and 
Horne (1987, 49). For a discussion of  the resurgence of  veiling practices in the wake of  the French 
colonization of  Algeria in 1830, see Lazreg (1994, 53-54). For a discussion of  how the veil has become 
used as a symbol of  resistance to colonization and imperialism following the American invasion of  
Afghanistan in 2001, see Armstrong (2002, 166) and Hoff (2018, 347). 
9 For other analyses of  the experience of  wearing a veil that draw on Merleau-Ponty’s concept of  the 
body schema, see Al-Saji (2010, 890) and Deyhim (unpublished). 
10 Indeed, the French engaged in public, ritualistic unveiling of  Algerian women in their attempt to 
demonstrate the cooperation of  the “natives” with the colonial regime. In Lazreg’s analysis, “to unveil 
women at a well-choreographed ceremony added to the event a symbolic dimension that dramatized the 
one constant feature of  the Algerian occupation by France: its obsession with women” (1994, 135). See 
also Drif ’s regular comparison of  colonialism to rape, as well as reports of  the ubiquity of  actual rape of  
Algerian women civilians and militants as a military tactic on the part of  the French (2017, 4, 70; Lazreg 
1994, 124; Vince 2015, 84-85, 240-44).
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If  we understand religion in Russon’s sense as the inherited, collective manner in which 
“a world becomes comfortably available for us” before it is a foregrounded matter of  self-
conscious, personal belief, then it no longer makes sense simply to contrast the modern 
Western, secular worldview with traditional, religious worldviews (1995, 517). This is 
true because—as we shall discuss further in Part III—“traditional” cultures do not exist 
as monoliths stuck in the past but as dynamic realities that are what they are in ongoing 
dialogue with the world around them. But it is also true because since its emergence with 
the Scientific and Industrial Revolutions, modern secular culture has come to constitute 
a kind of  “religion” of  its own—a disenchanted religion, but a religion nonetheless. The 
individual human being is what is of  ultimate value in this “religion.” In Shannon Hoff’s 
characterization, modernity has taken shape “around the demand that respect be accorded 
[the] individual, whatever her beliefs, values, or qualities . . . [and] involves an assertion 
of  the priority that the individual be able to live on her own terms” (2014, 355). We can 
see this way of  “enframing” things (as Heidegger says in “The Question Concerning 
Technology”) according to the supreme value of  individuals resonating in all spheres of  
modern life, such as the spheres of  science, economics, politics, and aesthetics—and this 
despite secularism’s supposed division of  existence into discrete spheres (1993, 324-26). 
Against traditional hierarchies and the monopolistic claims of  the Church over human 
knowledge, the modern scientific method celebrates the equality and interchangeability of  
human individuals as knowers; as we see in its emphasis on repeatability, modern science 
values what anyone can observe through experiments in the controlled setting of  a scientific 
laboratory (Russon 2017, 89-90). Modern capitalism quite swiftly overtook the traditional 
social hierarchies of  feudalism, proclaiming, in Karl Marx’s words, the values of  “Freedom, 
Equality, Property and Bentham” for all individuals (1994, 273).11 And the institution of  
universal human rights celebrates the dignity of  each individual human being as a rational 
agent capable of  self-determination and deserving of  protection against social institutions 
that would deny her the flourishing of  this capacity (Russon 2017, 81-86, 88-89, and 91-
92). On the one hand, the “sacred” value of  individualism is enormously emancipatory: it 
in principle frees individuals from the fetters of  hierarchical social arrangements that once 
defined their possibilities from birth. On the other hand, and ironically, individualism comes 
at a cost; the sacredness of  each individual can turn into what Russon calls “indifferent 
individuality,” where the equality of  each and all is transformed into the interchangeability 
of  one atomistically-conceived individual for any other (100). We can see this ambivalence 
of  the “religion” of  modernity expressed in the architectural structure of  the skyscraper, 
which, in stark contrast to the Greek temple or the Islamic mosque, asserts human power 
over nature—elevating the human being to the status of  “lord of  the earth,” as Heidegger 
says—and, with its efficient design and “panoptically” arranged cubicles, transforms human 
11 See Russon’s discussion of  modern capitalism (2017, 93-95).
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individuals into “human resources” (Heidegger 1993, 332).12 Individuals who fervently 
believe in the liberating values of  capitalism or in modern progress are nourished by the 
cultural backdrop that makes these beliefs seem obvious. From the other side, individuals who 
take a self-consciously critical stance on such values might find themselves pre-reflectively 
living in terms of  them all the same: such is the power of  religion—understood in terms of  
the collective cultural background in which individuals are formed as the individuals that 
they are—to render the dominant ways in which we colectively live largely unquestioned.
Insofar as they define the domain of  what is lived as largely obvious and unquestioned, 
all religious worldviews must render invisible their status as worldviews. However, with 
its emphasis on atomistic individualism and with its unparalleled imperial success, 
Western modernity has been perhaps uniquely recalcitrant in acknowledging its own 
worlded, historical, and “religious” character. In what Hans-Georg Gadamer calls the 
Enlightenment’s “prejudice against prejudice,” Western modernity tends to insist on its 
own view as uniquely objective rather than acknowledging and clarifying its own cultural 
and historical vantage point (1989, 273). As we shall see in what follows, this is not only 
an epistemological error, but has deleterious political consequences—harmful political 
consequences that phenomenology as a critical practice can help us to address.
 
III. PHENOMENOLOGY AND INTERCULTURAL TRANSFORMATION
When the rituals and practices of  the dominant culture are rendered obvious and 
unremarkable, the rituals and practices of  non-dominant or minority cultures are enabled 
to stand out, in their foreignness and exoticness, precisely as (stereotyped) cultural practices 
(Khader 2016, 731; Russon 1995, 519-25; Young 1990, 58-61). The opening lines of  
Fanon’s “Algeria Unveiled” show us how such cultural imperialism operates at the level 
of  perception itself. Fanon writes: “The way people clothe themselves, together with the 
traditions of  dress and finery that custom implies, constitutes the most distinctive form of  a 
society’s uniqueness, that is to say the one that is the most immediately perceptible” (1965, 
35). As Alia Al-Saji argues, however, when we read these lines we should ask ourselves, 
“most visible to whom?” (2010, 883). Fanon is taking on here the voice of  the French 
colonialist or the tourist, who typically sees upon arriving in Algeria the prevalence of  a 
homogeneous symbol of  a backwards, oppressive, monolithic culture in the form of  its 
traditional clothing. By contrast, for the Algerian, as we have seen, the traditional clothing 
of  women is both heterogeneous and rendered largely invisible through habituation; it 
becomes less spread out in front of  the gaze as it hides behind it, incorporated into the body 
schema. Russon makes a parallel point in his discussion of  the “religious” nature of  language. 
He writes: 
12 On panopticism, see Foucault (1997, 195-230). For a discussion of  modern skyscrapers that extends 
Hegel’s discussion of  architecture into contemporary practices drawing on Heidegger and Foucault, see 
Delikta (2018). 
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I once went to hear a Russian poet giving a reading of  his work. He 
performed some of  his works in English translation, and some in 
the original Russian. I do not speak Russian, and when he read the 
Russian poems I heard only the sounds. Periodically people in the 
audience would laugh or applaud, but I could in no way draw the 
connections between their actions and what he was saying. What I 
could do, however, was listen to the “music” of  the language, that 
is, I could attend to how it sounded: I could notice whether it was full 
of  hard sounds or soft, I could notice frequently repeated sounds, 
and so on. Then he would speak English, and everything would 
change. Suddenly I heard meanings: a world of  human significance 
was immediately communicated to me when he spoke . . . just as I am 
sure that my reader cannot fail to find the words of  this printed text 
immediately intelligible. Further, when I tried to isolate the mere 
audio component to compare English “music” to Russian “music,” 
I could not, and in all honesty I must say that I do not know what 
English sounds like. (Russon 1995, 520-21)
 
We can say, likewise, that the French colonialist did not in all honesty know what modern 
Western clothing looked like: the subtleties of  how this or that French individual dressed 
immediately conveyed meanings—say, about wealth or taste—but these subtle variations in 
meaning actually concealed, rather than revealed, the “look” of  this cultural practice as a 
cultural practice. The French’s stereotypical positing of  the veil as a metonymic symbol of  
the oppression of  Algerian women goes hand-in-hand with a rendering invisible of  their 
own “enlightened” practices as themselves cultural and religious; for example, it goes hand-
in-hand with obliviousness to the manner in which modern French apparel such as high-
heeled shoes and adornment practices such as makeup might not be merely the expression 
of  individual choice but a cultural norm contributing to the sexual objectification of  women 
(Al-Saji 2010, 876, 890; Narayan 2002, 424, 426).13
Cultural imperialism’s “Othering” is not simply reversible, as it is, arguably, for the 
Russian and the English speaker in the context described by Russon: the situation is 
definitively not equivalent for the respective invisibility and visibility of  cultural dress for 
the Algerian and for the French. With a military and economic stranglehold on Algeria—a 
stranglehold that hypocritically denied the rights of  freedom and equality to the “native” 
Algerian population—the French wielded modernity as a weapon. In addition to asserting 
13 Indeed, we can see a version of  this problem in Western feminist responses to “Othered” women 
such as that of  Okin—misapprehensions of  the nature of  agency and religion that have been linked in 
this century to support for state coercion and foreign intervention in the name of  “saving” women. See, 
for example, Pollitt’s (1999) support for the outlaw of  veiling in France and the American organization 
Feminist Majority Foundation’s support for the American invasion of  Afghanistan (Rich 2014). See also 
Narayan’s (2002, 425-31) and Al-Saji’s (2010) criticisms of  Western feminist support for state coercion 
with regard to practices said to harm women in non-Western cultures. For a discussion of  the manner in 
which the discourse of  European feminism has been used and abused in colonial contexts in the Middle 
East, specifically with regard to veiling, see Leila Ahmed (1992, 144-68).
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the unremarkable “normality” of  their own ways of  dressing, the French asserted their 
own cultural values with regard to gender relations as “emancipated,” and expressed 
paternalistic consternation at the Algerians’ “backward” failure to happily embrace these 
values. From the perspective of  Muslim Algerians, the European values in question were 
not themselves necessarily the problem. As Karen Armstrong argues, during their early 
encounters with an increasingly powerful Europe during the eighteenth century, 
[t]here was . . . no intrinsic reason why Muslims should reject the 
ethos of  the new Europe. Over the centuries they had cultivated 
virtues that would also be crucial to the modern West: a passion for 
social justice, an egalitarian polity, freedom of  speech and . . . a de 
facto . . . separation of  religion and politics. (2002, 136) 
What the Algerian Muslims resisted when they refused to change their clothing or for wives 
to accompany their husbands to pied-noir parties was rather the violence, hypocrisy, and 
paternalism of  colonialism itself  (Drif  2017, 124; Fanon 1965, 40; Horne 1987, 50-51). As 
Fanon writes, “[b]ehind these psychological reactions, beneath this immediate and almost 
unanimous response, we again see the overall attitude of  rejection of  the values of  the 
occupier, even if  these values objectively be worth choosing” (1965, 62-63, emphasis added). 
Phenomenology as a philosophical practice provides a powerful route to identifying 
and uncovering the specific kinds of  epistemological and cultural violence at play in such 
situations as colonial Algeria. It enables us to estrange and interrogate the relationship 
between perception and what is perceived, which ordinarily remains familiar and 
unquestioned. Phenomenology requires that we turn our attention from the contents of  our 
lived experience in the natural attitude to the forms of  our experience itself, bringing to the 
foreground the structures of  vision that normally reside in the background.14 Sara Ahmed 
identifies two senses of  background that are relevant for this kind of  phenomenological work: 
A background can refer to the “ground or parts situated in the rear” 
. . . or to the portions of  the picture represented at a distance, which 
in turn allow what is “in” the foreground to acquire the shape that 
it does, as a figure or object. Both of  these meanings point to the 
“spatiality” of  the background. We can also think of  background 
as having a temporal dimension . . . We might speak . . . of  “family 
background,” which would refer not just to the past of  an individual 
but also to other kinds of  histories, which shape an individual’s 
arrival into the world. (2006, 38)
14 On phenomenology as a special kind of  estrangement from the natural attitude, see Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty’s descriptions of  phenomenology as an attitude of  “‘wonder’ before the world,” and as 
“loosen[ing] the intentional threads that connect us to the world in order to make them appear” (2012, 
lxxvii) and Gayle Salamon’s discussion of  these passages, which she argues renders phenomenological 
description not a form of  mastery that confirms what the transcendental subject already knows, but a 
kind of  “rupture, a making-strange of  the world” (2018, 11).
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Phenomenological description enables us to begin to seek out “the conditions of  emergence” 
for both things in the perceived world and for the embodied, situated perceiver her or himself  
(38). “Spatially,” the attitude of  cultural imperialism can learn to interrupt the naturalness 
of  its own stereotypical, Orientalist enframing of  the Muslim world, so as to recognize this 
enframing as responsible for the appearance of  the veiled Muslim woman as a monolithic 
symbol of  the oppressed Other rather than as a personally and culturally complex subject 
with her own intelligent point of  view on the shared situation. “Temporally,” the attitude 
of  cultural imperialism can learn to estrange and interrogate what is normally given as 
familiar and unquestioned, so as to let the complex histories sedimented in its own vision 
and in the things of  the world begin to come to light as historical rather than natural. 
Much as Marx teaches us to see everyday commodities not as naturally given values but as 
congealed human labor, phenomenology can help us to experience both one’s own ways 
of  seeing and the appearance of  things and others not as natural givens but as the manner 
in which long histories of  unequal relations of  power show themselves in the world (1994, 
230-43; Ahmed 2006, 41).
When one ceases stereotyping and exotifying other cultures, then possibilities for more 
honest kinds of  criticism of  oppressive practices become possible (Russon 1995, 519-25). 
Phenomenology can help with this, too. When we attend phenomenologically to the forms 
of  experience as it is actually lived in diverse geographical and historical contexts, then 
individuals are enabled to appear not as stereotypical victims of  monolithic, oppressive 
cultures, but as complex beings who have become who they are, with the specific capacities 
that they enjoy and struggles that they face, in particular, habitual, and intersubjective 
cultural worlds.15 On the one hand, identity and agency in all their richness and complexity 
are revealed as concrete, particular, embedded, and historical rather than abstract, 
universal, unencumbered, and ahistorical. On the other hand, identity and agency in all 
their richness and complexity are revealed as sharing certain common features across great 
empirical variation: they are shown, precisely, to always be matters of  world, habit, and 
intersubjectivity. When we recognize this, we can criticize both the liberal-secular human 
rights discourses that advance their claims as if  individual identity and agency were not 
deeply dependent upon worlds, processes of  habituation, and intersubjective support, and 
cultural practices that work to suppress the emergence of  agential individuals from the 
worlds, processes of  habituation, and intersubjective support that nurture this emergence 
(even when these cultural practices wish to deny the claims of  this individual agency). 
Consider the following description from Drif  of  a special domain of  women’s agency 
in the context of  colonial Algiers in the 1950s:
 
15 On the imperative of  engaging with a diversity of  cultural experiences in our phenomenological 
studies of  human existence, see Merleau-Ponty’s re-working of  Husserl’s method of  imaginative 
variation (1964b, 70, 90, 92 and 1964a, 120).
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The only domain where women enjoyed unquestioned, inviolable 
sovereignty was the hammam [public baths], where women of  all 
backgrounds, social standings, and ages gathered in solidarity, 
momentarily free from the twin powers that imposed themselves 
upon us—men and the French . . . This was where the details of  
great exploits and achievements reached us, narrated as only 
Algerian women could do. They wove tales like they wove carpets or 
embroidery, with meticulously recounted places, dates, names, and 
other minutiae. As if  anticipating our imaginations’ wanderings, 
they also added links to our own history and legends, our illustrious 
ancestors, our mythical heroes, and even to the souhaba—the 
companions of  our Prophet Mohammed (peace be upon him). In 
the hammam, women told us that henceforth our heroes were called 
moudjahidine, or combatants, and that those who were killed by the 
French army would be known as chouhada, or martyrs . . . We lapped 
up the words, not missing a single detail of  their stories, which could 
be divulged only in this haven of  trust and secrecy. (Drif  2017, 41)
What we witness here is diverse women who are very much of  a cultural world, but 
not simply reducible to this world: we witness creative agents in the process of  realizing 
their agency precisely in terms of  a shared cultural and historical world that they know 
intimately and love. To know and love one’s own cultural and historical world is not to 
be incapable of  criticizing it, however; to say that individuals are cultural through and 
through is not to say that they are simply the passive “dupes” of  culture, to adapt Narayan’s 
phrase. Drif  describes a potent domain of  women’s agency that bypasses oppressive forces 
within their own culture—“men”—precisely in order to advance the cause of  Algerian 
independence and oppose the forces that undermine this cause—“the French.” But this is 
done not by insisting on the rights of  individual women apart from cultural world, habit, and 
intersubjectivity, but rather by adopting a critical stance towards oppressive practices from 
within a cultural world, and deploying one’s agency to realize the potentials of  this cultural 
world in an emancipatory and inclusive manner.16
What we witness in Drif ’s description in addition to the “worlded” and intersubjective 
nature of  agency is, therefore, the palimpsestic richness of  cultures: our cultural heritages 
are not monolithic, but open to multiple, fecund, and divergent interpretations (Russon 
2017, 73). Indeed, there is no religious culture “in itself ”; rather, as many ulama [religious 
and legal scholars] have recognized since the early days of  Islam, religious cultures are always 
a matter of  interpretation on the part of  those living them. Even the most traditional and 
conservative visions of  how societies should be organized on the basis of  their foundational 
16 Narayan criticizes the conservative or fundamentalist strategy of  pitting feminism against a nationalist 
love for one’s own culture, and of  accusing women who embrace feminism are “cultural traitors” or 
“stooges of  Western imperialism” (1998, 91). See also Lazreg’s discussion of  Algerian women’s rejec-
tion of  French feminism—and rejection of  French women’s attempts to advocate for Algerian women’s 
rights—but concurrent admiration for emancipatory changes in women’s status in Middle Eastern and 
Asian countries (1994, 94).
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religious principles are, precisely, visions: they are situated, interpretive stances on how a 
people should relate to its own past, and on what in its heritage should be taken up and 
what ignored. However, ultra-conservative or “fundamentalist” religious groups—such as 
the Taliban in Afghanistan between 1996 and 2001—seek to deny the interpretive and 
hence agential nature of  their own stance, on the one hand, and the ineluctably interpretive 
and hence agential nature of  the individuals they seek to control, on the other.17 A story 
about ‘Ali, one of  Mohammed’s close companions and his fourth successor as leader of  
the Muslim community [ummah], captures this insight from an Islamic perspective. As 
recounted by Khaled Abou El-Fadl: 
. . . members of  the Khawarij accused ‘Ali of  accepting the judgment 
and dominion (hakimiyya) of  human beings instead of  abiding by the 
dominion of  God’s law. Upon hearing of  this accusation, ‘Ali called 
upon the people to gather and brought a large copy of  the Qu’ran. ‘Ali 
touched the Qu’ran, commanding it to speak to the people and inform 
them about God’s law. The people gathered around ‘Ali and one of  
them exclaimed, “What are you doing! The Qu’ran cannot speak, for 
it is not a human being.” Upon hearing this, ‘Ali exclaimed that this is 
exactly the point he was trying to make! The Qu’ran, ‘Ali stated, is but 
ink and paper, and it is human beings who give effect to it according to 
their limited personal judgments. (2003, 319)
 
When we recognize the ineluctably interpretive nature of  even the most submissive existence, 
Oshana’s imaginary Taliban woman can be seen to inhabit an inherently self-contradictory 
stance, however much she—or any advocate of  a “fundamentalist” interpretation 
of  any religion—might labor to cover over this contradiction. As Armstrong argues, 
“[a]ny ‘reformation,’ however conservative its intention, is always a new departure, and an 
adaptation of  the faith to the particular challenges of  the reformer’s own time” (2002, 76).18
In contrast to Oshana’s imaginary Taliban woman, observe Drif, Lakhdari, and 
Bouhired’s creative relationship to their own identity as Muslim women in the following 
anecdote from Drif, in which she describes the three young women breaking into hysterical 
laughter at something while hiding out in the Casbah in the wake of  the young women’s 
bombings in Algiers:
It wasn’t long before Lalla [the young women’s elderly host] came 
and lectured us to remember that our Prophet (peace be upon him) 
    
  
17 As Hegel demonstrates in his analysis of  lordship and bondage, even the active submission and carry-
ing out of  orders on the part of  the slave requires the exercise of  understanding, agency, and the capacity 
to reshape the things of  her world (1977, 111-19). For an interpretation of  Hegel’s analysis of  Sophocles’s 
Antigone in light of  the master-slave dialectic and the inevitability of  interpretation and conscience, even 
when one takes oneself  to be simply playing one’s prescribed “role,” see Russon (2004, 59-69). 
18 See also Armstrong’s interpretation of  religious fundamentalism as a particularly modern phenome-
non, and one intimately related to European colonialism and its legacy (2002, 164-75). 
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recommended total discretion for women, whose voices should 
stay inaudible even when they prayed! We teased her in response, 
recalling that our Prophet (peace be upon him) loved women and 
music, and fell into another fit of uncontained laughter, leaving her 
to conclude that we were three truly sorry moudjahidate. (2017, 142)
For Drif, Lakhdari, and Bouhired, what it meant to be women and pious Muslims in Algeria 
in the 1950s was not a question that came with ready-made answers handed down from 
a static past, but a question that required creative interpretations of  a dynamic past in 
light of  the realities and demands of  the present situation. Sometimes—as we already saw 
in our discussion of  changing habits in Part I—being a pious Muslim required breaking 
social rules for women that, though they were by no means the only way to interpret 
Mohammed’s teachings on the proper relationship between the sexes, had previously been 
lived as inviolable.
Something is fundamentally amiss in political situations that fail to recognize and 
honor the historically complex, dynamic, and interpretive nature of  human existence, be 
these political situations those of  colonial violence or of  “traditional” cultural regimes. But 
phenomenology as a critical practice can do more than help us to identify modern liberal-
secular prejudices that deny the formative powers of  world, habituation, and intersubjectivity, 
and it can do more than help us to criticize social and political institutions that fail to live up 
to the inherently interpretive and agential nature of  human experience. Phenomenology as 
a critical practice can also help us to articulate more honest forms of  cultural identity and 
more just forms of  cross-cultural engagement in a thoroughly multicultural world. Above, 
we spoke of  cultural, “religious” worlds as horizons of  significance, but, as Gadamer argues 
with his concept of  a “fusion of  horizons,” it is important to note that horizons are not 
prisons but rather openings onto a beyond (1989, 299-306; see also Alcoff 2005, 94-102 and 
Taylor 1995, 67). Horizons are not fixed in space, but move with the one moving, changing 
and expanding in our encounters with other perspectives and their horizons. We can see a 
fusion of  horizons at play in the manner in which emancipatory social and political change 
in fact occurs in history, and, by descriptively attending to the nature of  such change, we can 
arrive at some normative prescriptions for how we should approach intercultural criticism 
and dialogue going forward. 
With Algeria officially gaining independence from French colonial rule in 1962, the 
Algerian War of  Independence became a potent symbol for decolonial movements around 
the world. There is much to learn not only from the victory of  the Algerian revolutionaries, 
but also from the strategies deployed to achieve this victory. In order to obtain freedom 
and independence, the Algerian revolutionaries drew in surprising and creative ways on 
cultural resources from their own (palimpsestic) national history and from the history of  
Islam. For example, Berber Muslims, integral to the Algerian struggle against the French 
occupying forces, were formerly a people informed by Jewish culture in North Africa before 
being “unified” during Muslim conquest of  the Maghreb in the seventh century A.D—an 
invasion which, as legend has it, the Judaized Berbers resisted under the military leadership 
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of  Dihya, the “Berber queen” or “Jewish sorceress,” who continues to be a potent symbol 
of  both resistance to foreign invasion and feminine power (Lazreg 1994, 20-21). Though 
women in the FLN had to engage in activities that would normally be in violation of  Islamic 
principles as widely interpreted in Algeria in the 1950s, they were presented with examples 
to emulate of  women who had fought alongside men throughout Islamic history (Lazreg 
1994, 137). The FLN also maintained certain forms of  “traditional” gender relations by 
recontextualizing them in light of  present needs, organizing battalions according to familial 
structures with men and women calling each other khouya (brother) and oukh’t (sister) and 
with traditional gestures of  respect for elders (men and women) maintained (Vince 2010, 
465). As well as drawing in creative ways on Algerian and Islamic history, the revolutionaries 
drew in subversive ways on cultural resources from their French occupiers. As we have 
seen, women revolutionaries donned modern French clothing, hair dye, and makeup in 
order to smuggle weapons across French checkpoints, and they also drew on their French 
educations—which allowed them to study philosophical and literary works from Ancient 
Greece and Rome, from the Enlightenment and the French Revolution, and from Marxism 
and Existentialism—for spiritual inspiration and intellectual support (Vince 2010, 452-
54; Drif  2017, 103, 108, 112). Finally, the Algerian revolutionaries had their courage and 
conviction bolstered by the examples of  other successful armed resistances and revolutions, 
such as the victory in Indochina (now Vietnam) against French colonialism in 1954 and—
ironically—the French Resistance against the Nazi occupation from 1940 to 1944.19
What we see here is a complex fusion of  horizons in which two remarkable things occur. 
First, modern European ideas—such as the French Revolution’s Declaration of  the Rights 
of  Man and the Citizen—are given new, concrete life and, arguably, are enabled to become 
more fully themselves by being “transpose[d],” as Gadamer says, into new contexts (1989, 
302). Second, Algerian culture—including its social norms around gender—becomes 
irrevocably transformed, as well. Though it would not be immune from fundamentalist 
backlashes in the ensuing decades, “traditional” gender relations in Algeria—including the 
“traditional” dress of  women—could never simply be the “same” again. As Fanon argues, 
after the Algerian victory the veil was “stripped once and for all of  its exclusively traditional 
dimension” (1965, 63). And as Russon argues, the French got what they wanted, but not in 
the manner expected or hoped for (2017, 116-17).
Fusions of  horizons need not be peaceful. Algerian culture was irreversibly transformed 
in bellicose dialogue with French colonialism—and by no means simply for the worst. John 
Dewey writes: “the alleged benefits of  war, so far as more than alleged, spring from the fact 
that conflict of  peoples at least enforces intercourse between them and thus accidentally 
19 See Drif ’s pained description of  meeting with Germaine Tillion, a member of  the French Resistance 
and an ethnologist working in Algerian on behalf  of  the French government: “Was it because she was 
French that she couldn’t bear to hear us compare an Algeria occupied by her people to France occupied 
by the Germans?” (2017, 277). Of  course, many members of  the French Resistance wholeheartedly 
supported the Algerian War of  Independence in the late 1950s, notably Jean-Paul Sartre and Merleau-
Ponty. 
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enables them to learn from one another, and thereby to expand their horizons” (2008, 92). 
To grant this is not to justify colonialism or war, but only to acknowledge that we have and 
we will change in our contact with other cultures, whether we like it or not. In the case of  
the Algerians, cultural self-determination was possible not on the basis of  a nostalgic return 
to a “pure” national past. Rather, Algerian self-determination was the projection of  an 
imaginary unity that was not a pre-existing reality but a revolutionary response to the French 
occupation; it was a way of  making use of  a violent history in their own way and on their 
own terms.
 
IV. CONCLUSION:  
PHENOMENOLOGICAL IMPERATIVES IN A MULTICULTURAL WORLD
Certain normative imperatives can be gleaned from phenomenological attention to the 
nature of  emancipatory social and political change as it has actually taken place in the 
historical experience of  real women and men. Drif  had her own cultural horizons expanded 
through her study of  classical Greek and Western European writings, and at the same time 
let the insights of  these texts speak anew in her own situation as a Muslim in Northern 
Africa in the mid-twentieth century. Similarly, rather than stereotyping and exotifying the 
foreign Other, a modern Westerner might rather seek what is insightful and valuable in the 
practices of  other cultures, finding alternative expressions of  some of  their own meanings 
and values “transposed” there. For example, instead of  looking with suspicion and discomfort 
at the veils worn by some Muslim women in the Middle East or in European or North 
American contexts—instead of  seeing them, as in Russon’s description of  listening to the 
Russian poet, as sound without sense—one might seek in them meaningful religious and 
political gestures. Or, instead of  looking with incomprehension at the “terroristic” deeds 
of  the Algerian revolutionaries and finding nothing of  oneself  in them, one might listen to 
the voices of  the revolutionaries themselves and discover in them the same kind of  courage, 
commitment, and desire for independence that one most likely admires in, say, those who 
fought in the French Resistance. An epistemological commitment of  this sort makes room 
for the meaningful perspectives and voices of  others, and begins to transform one’s own 
perspective in ways that one cannot know or control in advance. This epistemological 
commitment must also be an ethical-political commitment to the value of  multiculturalism, 
that is, to the development of  a domain in which we can actually encounter one another, 
not insisting on one’s own “normality” and superiority, but instead enabling new, surprising, 
and often challenging truths to emerge in a palimpsestic, dynamic historical world.
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